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Abstract: 
According to an increasingly prevalent set of discourses and practices within environmental and 
development finance, cities across the Global South are facing a costly infrastructural crisis 
stemming from rapid urbanization and climate change that threatens to further entrench poverty 
and precarity for millions of people. But the cost of achieving urban resilience across the world 
dwarfs available public finance, both from development banks and governments themselves. 
Meanwhile, vast amounts of money on capital markets are searching for profitable investment 
opportunities. The World Bank is attempting to channel return-seeking investment into urban 
infrastructure in response to these challenges. But in order to harness this private finance, cities 
must be reformatted in investment friendly ways. In this paper, we chart the emergence of this 
discourse and associated practices within the World Bank. We call this rescaled and climate-
inflicted program of leveraged investments coupled with technical assistance Green Structural 
Adjustment. Drawing on policy documents, reports, and interviews with key staff, we examine 
programs that comprise Green Structural Adjustment to show how it aims to restructure local 
governments to capture new financial flows. Green Structural Adjustment reduces adaptation to 
a question of infrastructure finance and government capacity building, reinscribing both causes 
and effects of uneven development while creating spatial fixes for overaccumulated Northern 
capital in the Global South.  
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Over the 1980s and 1990s, the World Bank1 and International Monetary Fund (IMF) restructured 
vast swathes of the global economy in response to the Third World Debt Crisis. The pair 
administered 196 structural adjustment programs (SAPs) in 64 countries in the 1980s, growing to 
346 SAPs in 98 countries in the 1990s (Swaroop 2016)2. SAPs offered debt restructuring and 
fresh loans in exchange for the fulfillment of ‘conditionalities’: sweeping policy reforms that 
pried open markets in debtor countries while cutting state service provision, lowering 
environmental standards, and allowing interest rates to rise, subsidies to fall, and currencies to 
float. The results were, by and large, calamitous. The 1980s in particular came to be seen as a 
‘lost decade’ for development as prosperity and wellbeing deteriorated across much of the 
Global South, trends often exacerbated in individual countries and regions by multiple rounds of 
structural adjustment (Hickel 2017). The era of structural adjustment formally came to an end in 
2002 with the Bank transitioning to a more explicit focus on poverty alleviation and state 
capacity building, while the IMF’s role remained macro-economic stability (Goldman 2005). In 
the Bank, the terminology of structural adjustment was phased out in favor of the gentler-
sounding ‘Development Policy Lending’ (Swaroop 2016, 6). 
We argue that, as the impacts of climate change begin to bite in cities across the world, there is a 
new era of structural adjustment at hand: ‘Green Structural Adjustment’ (GSA). GSA mimics 
many aspects of 20th century structural adjustment, but with three important variations. First, 
GSA is triggered not by unmanageable debt, as in the 1980s, but by a lack of access to debt 
across Global South cities coupled with an overabundance of stagnant Northern capital in search 
of returns. This is a key structural dynamic of GSA, as Bank programs aim to create 
opportunities to spatially-fix Northern capital mired in low yields in established markets and 
asset classes. The second difference is one of scale. The Bank is trying to create access to debt 
and investable projects, where they do not currently exist, allowing cities to borrow money to 
manage impending crises caused by rapid urbanization and climate change. Where SAPs 
targeted nation-states as the sites of policy reform and competent scale of borrowing, now 
municipalities are treated as the appropriate administrative unit. The third key difference is the 
explicit focus on climate, a departure from the environmentally calamitous lending of the Bank 
in the SAP era (Goldman, 2005).  
We show that, through wide-ranging Bank interventions, GSA aims to reformat local 
governments across the Global South into reflections of Northern counterparts that have the 
capacity to borrow on international credit markets, use sophisticated environmental data to plan 
urban resilience projects, and manage contracts with global infrastructure companies to roll out 
public-private partnerships in the name of achieving ‘resilience’. The conditionalities that 
comprise GSA do not come with the threat that, if unfulfilled, bailouts will be withheld, as in 
earlier SAPs. Instead, the Bank is the herald of investors, bearing the message that if city 
                                                          
1 Which we refer to as ‘the Bank’ throughout.  
2 SAPs were led by the IMF in the case of ‘pure’ balance of payments crises that required quick debt restructuring 
with conditionalities that foregrounded austerity, while World Bank lending was more directed to specific projects 
with conditionalities that turned on opening markets and relaxing other regulations. The two forms of 
conditionality were often imposed together as part of joint lending packages (Colgan, 2002). 
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governments are not reformed in investment-friendly ways, those cities will continue to be cut 
off from access to the $106 trillion3 swirling on global capital markets (World Bank 2015b, 57). 
Access to private capital is portrayed as critical not only for development, but for social, 
economic, and environmental resilience in the face of climate change, the cost of which far 
exceeds existing, or even imaginable, public funds. Where SAPs achieved spectacular de- and re-
regulation and asset stripping (Corbridge, 1994), GSA operates through manifold policy-tweaks 
that seek to cultivate investable, managerial cities, empowering Northern experts to guide 
municipal policy. The conditionalities that comprise GSA seek to render cities investable 
through reforms in municipal governance, the production and analysis of environmental data, 
and various forms of administrative capacity building. The Bank’s supposedly post-ideological 
pragmatism, born of its rebranding to ‘solutions bank’ in the early 2010s (Denning 2012), turns 
on impotent national and supranational action on climate and the supposed omnipotence of 
financiers who will only come to the rescue of vulnerable cities if the exacting needs of investors 
for project preparation, data and returns are met.  
In this paper we demonstrate the character, scope and extent of GSA, focusing on how it is 
driven by, and unfolds within, the Bank. We argue that GSA is not, directly, about the 
financialization of resilience or infrastructure; rather, it is a policy architecture seeking to 
produce cities as investment sites, with investors (and the Bank) the default experts for achieving 
urban resilience.4 In tracing the emergence of GSA, we bring together several geographical 
literatures, including on development finance, the financialization of environmental and social 
goods and services, and critical assessments of resilience. We casually tie GSA to SAPs, chart 
continuities and ruptures between the two paradigms, and signal the structurally coherent, if 
geographically dispersed, nature of GSA. The structural – and uneven geographical – stakes of 
this argument are that the Bank, in concert with other powerful actors in the global development 
and financial industries, is facilitating transformations to allow cities in the Global South to sop 
up excess capital from the Global North. It is a preparatory program for creating ‘surfaces’ to 
which spatially-fixing capital might adhere, producing new geographies of rent extraction 
through regulatory reform and co-financing to meet resilience qua infrastructure needs (Harvey, 
1982; Mezzadra and Neilson, 2019). 
The scope of GSA is large and growing. In a 2016 interview, a World Bank Urban Resilience 
Specialist claimed to have worked on 77 urban resilience projects across 40 countries, involving 
almost $10 billion;5 the Bank now aims to facilitate $500 billion into urban resilience in 500 
cities (IEG 2019). To illustrate our argument, we draw on examples from across cities that 
exemplify how different components of GSA are being implemented. We selected cases across 
world regions and income levels to demonstrate that, despite specific contexts, GSA is a 
widespread phenomenon with structured coherence. Our arguments are based on an initial 
review of hundreds of World Bank and associated reports, webinars, webpages, and project 
documents, followed by a thorough review of more than 90 World Bank reports and technical 
documents, supplemented with data from project documents and Country Policy Frameworks. 
The second author conducted fieldwork with World Bank officials in Jakarta and Washington 
D.C. about the growing importance of environmental and financial innovation to achieving urban 
                                                          
3 All monetary sums are in USD except where noted otherwise.  
4 Thanks to generous reviewers for providing this more forceful wording.  
5 Interview, World Bank Urban Resilience Specialist, Washington DC, September 2016 
 
 4 
resilience between 2016 to 2019, including ten interviews that directly inform the analysis here.6 
Where we draw on information learned through interviews, we note the informant’s job title, and 
the date and location of the interview. Using our database of Bank documents and interview 
transcripts, we inductively analyzed this data to identify the discourses, policies and practices 
that comprise the Bank’s agenda. In order to trace and outline GSA, our analysis relies upon 
secondary sources and interview data from technical experts; further research will be required to 
chart how GSA manifests – socially, environmentally, and economically – in specific cities over 
the years to come. Similarly, our argument is constrained to the Bank. It is certainly not the only 
pertinent actor in GSA7, but the Bank’s geographical, financial, and technical reach warrants 
particular attention.  
The paper proceeds in four sections. In the next section, we chart the shift from SAPs to GSA by 
way of pertinent geographical literatures: the policies and practices driving contemporary forms 
of development policy writ large, the financialization of nature and infrastructure, and critical 
assessments of resilience. Then, we explore how these ideological commitments are mobilized as 
GSA in a new era of ‘There Is No Alternative’, one in which the inescapable conditions are not 
roll-back neoliberalization, but rendering cities investable in a high-liquidity, low return world. 
In the third section, we locate the constituent practices of GSA in two exemplary initiatives, the 
City Resilience Program and the City Creditworthiness Initiative. We also outline the financial 
mechanisms that green conditionalities are meant to facilitate, from ‘vanilla’ Development 
Policy Lending to more exotic, private sector-oriented pathways. We conclude by locating green 
conditionalities in the world of climate-financial entanglements, where financiers have, in the 
minds of elites, become the only credible actors to prevent socioenvironmental catastrophe, then 
identify specific research needed to interpret spatially and political-economically divergent 
outcomes from GSA interventions across the world.  
II. From SAPs to GSA 
There is a fairly direct connection between 20th Century SAPs and contemporary GSA. The 
phrase ‘Washington Consensus’ was offered by Williamson in the late 1980s to refer to a 
collection of policies that were “common sensical” for facilitating development, including 
deregulation and liberalization of trade, privatization of state enterprises, and enforcing private 
property regimes (Williamson 2000). The conditionalities of structural adjustment were geared 
towards imposing this ideological position on insolvent countries. As the debt crises that 
precipitated SAPs were framed as a balance of payments problem, reforms aimed to lower trade 
barriers to restructure rural economies and accelerate earnings from agricultural and primary 
materials exports while reducing imports (e.g. Samatar 1993). However, the implementation of 
the Washington Consensus was considerably more diverse across countries than a singular, anti-
statist focus on liberalization, privatization, and economic growth (Naim 2000), much like GSA 
today.  
                                                          
6 Two interviews with Urban Resilience Specialists are particularly pertinent for our argument and so are 
referenced throughout the analysis. 
7 Others include philanthropies such as the Rockefeller Foundation, global consulting firms such as Arup and 
AECOM (Leitner et al 2018; Webber et al Forthcoming), investors and other financial actors such as ratings 
agencies, and city and national governments 
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In the wake of the profound failures of the Washington Consensus, critics have diagnosed 
several new development paradigms. A post-Washington Consensus of the early 2000s criticized 
the market-led, globalizing focus of its predecessor (Naim 2000; Stiglitz 2002), instead focusing 
on good governance, democracy and institutions, an increased role for neo-Keynesian states and 
government regulation, and poverty reduction, empowerment and social capital (Fine 1999; 
Sheppard and Leitner 2010) even while neoliberal prescriptions remained central to development 
programming.8 Part of this shift stemmed from internal criticisms of Washington Consensus 
programming as New Institutional Economics gained traction in the development industry and 
the failures of Structural Adjustment became clear (Best 2014). More recently, development 
commentators declare the post-Washington Consensus over; Mitchell and Sparke (2016) 
diagnose a shift towards a New Washington Consensus (NWC). The hegemonic, if contingent, 
New Washington Consensus is an interplay between micro-market transformations of 
communities and individuals to overcome macro-market failure. NWC is less “top-down 
structural adjustment” and more “bottom-up innovations in market-making by new market 
subjects” (Mitchell and Sparke 2016, 732) with an emphasis on rendering development 
investable by private sector financiers (Mawdsley 2018a). Similarly, Gabor (2019) diagnoses the 
consolidation of the ‘Wall Street Consensus’ that, “re-imagines international development 
interventions as opportunities for global finance” (25). For the Bank9, these consensuses are co-
articulated as a progressive restructuring from lead lender to countries perceived as bad risks into 
a ‘creature of Wall Street’ (Thomas 2018); direct development assistance is out, blended finance 
to facilitate win-win-win investments for institutional investors that unleash entrepreneurial 
development subjects is in. This manifests across the Bank’s portfolio, from Social Bonds that 
finance women entrepreneurs to emergency financing facilities for refugee host countries. These 
programs, along with others (especially those that comprise GSA), aim to use Bank money as a 
catalyst to prompt private sector investment. As former Director General Kim put it, the bank has 
moved away from direct lending to undertake activities to ‘systemically derisk’ not just projects, 
but entire countries, (Kim 2017; Stein and Sridhar 2017).  
While any substantive institutional reorientation, like GSA, will have a variety of impetuses, we 
argue that many of the policy, economic, and even environmental conditions produced through 
20th century structural adjustment are a casual factor in the conditions that GSA targets, from 
underinvestment in public goods to structural imbalances in global capital accumulation. In 
Mexico for example, state-owned infrastructure was a significant component of its debt in 1982, 
and was, therefore, a target of conditionalities in the wake of the state’s technical default that 
kicked off the broader debt crisis. This included expansive hydraulic infrastructure that watered 
Mexican crops, produced hydroelectricity, and piped water to rapidly growing and increasingly 
thirsty Mexico City. One of the first reforms imposed in the wake of the 1983 bailout was the 
transfer of responsibility for water provision from the federal government to municipalities, 
including Mexico City (Salazar 2007). This took significant maintenance and operational costs 
off the national balance sheet, began a nationwide process of decentralization, and laid the 
groundwork for escalating rounds of commercialization of water (Wilder and Romero-Lankao 
                                                          
8 The relative importance of ‘good governance’ versus structural adjustment is up for debate (including whether 
they constitute distinct ideologies or programs), as are the normative implications of this shift (see Sheppard and 
Leitner 2010). 
9 The IMF has maintained the logics and practices of Structural Adjustment in the ‘post’ Structural Adjustment era, 
perhaps even accelerating in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis, despite claims to have transitioned away from 
highly prescriptive austerity measures as a condition for rescue packages (Kentikelenis et. al, 2016) 
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2006). Since then, transnational companies have played an increasing role in water provision for 
Mexico City, with associated underinvestment, deterioration, and rent seeking (Adler 2015; 
Wilder and Romero-Lankao 2006). Seeking ‘sustainable water solutions’ to a worsening crisis, 
Mexico City has now issued three green bonds, two of which have directly funded more 
commercialized water infrastructure (Arce Lozano and Davalos 2019). Mexico City thus reflects 
many of the qualities that the Bank hopes to impart in cities through GSA, including devolved 
borrowing capacity, a high credit rating backed by sovereign guarantee, access to, and 
sophisticated use of, environmental data for planning projects, and fully developed national and 
local public-private partnership regulations for infrastructure. Becoming investable was helped 
along by Structural Adjustment and other contentious federal economic policy adjustments (e.g. 
NAFTA, see Vasquez 2015), alongside municipal and development actors, including the Bank. 
The Bank estimates that by 2030 Mexico City will have almost $40 billion in privately 
investable infrastructure projects, facilitated by Mexico’s 2016 national PPP law and capacity 
building in departments across municipal government (IFC 2018). GSA aims replicate this 
model across Southern cities, often as a response to problems caused or exacerbated by 20th 
Century SAPs.  
More generally across the Global South, common conditionalities of 20th century SAPs, 
including ‘rationalizing’ agriculture and decreasing spending on state services, contributed to 
population flows into cities and growth in precarious urban communities (Davis 2006). World 
Bank economists subsequently puzzled over ‘urbanization without growth’ (Fay and Opal 1999). 
Meanwhile, reduced trade and investment barriers instituted through SAPs assisted growth in 
hydrocarbons and raw material extraction and export in countries possessing such resources, 
turbocharging rich world consumption and associated greenhouse gas emissions. Structural 
adjustment-facilitated extractivism simultaneously degraded local environmental conditions and 
globally increased exposure to environmental risks brought on by greenhouse gas emissions 
associated with the acceleration of industrial production and distribution of goods manufactured 
from those materials (Hickel 2017). In the decades since structural adjustment, the volume of 
investable money has swelled such that financial markets are bloated with liquidity in search of 
yields. Through GSA, cities must now compete, with World Bank assistance, for this funding on 
international markets if they are to build resilience to deteriorating, unpredictable environmental 
conditions. 
One key aspect of both the New Washington Consensus and Wall Street Consensus is an 
expansive rhetoric that private capital is the only solution to a dizzying variety of developmental, 
social, and environmental issues. This outlook goes under monikers like ‘impact investing’ 
(Rosenman 2019) and ‘philanthrocapitalism’ (Mediavilla and Garcia-Arias 2019). The 
conditions, ideas, and practices that structure these interventions all turn on faith in the 
“transformative power of markets” coupled with the waning power of states to effectively deal 
with social (Lake 2015), environmental (Schmidt and Matthews 2018), and development 
(Mawdsley 2018b) issues alongside the increasing concentration of capital with the global 
investor class. Geographers have tended to describe these interventions as the ‘financialization of 
X’ (Christophers 2015) – a formula that turns on how various bits of the world are made to 
perform as bankable projects, and what those projects do. 
In this article, we are not concerned with the performance of bankable projects per se – whether 
or not they achieve a measure of urban resilience or produce new ‘financialized’ natures, for 
instance. Instead, we focus on the sundry interlocking programs, facilities, discourses, and 
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practices that are meant to foster the conditions of bankability, perhaps the preconditions for 
financialization of urban adaptation in cities not currently legible to investors. That is, we ask: 
how are cities being rendered investable to achieve the World Bank’s version of urban 
resilience? GSA does not necessarily produce any new financial mechanisms, nor new concerns 
on the part of financiers, but instead entails new governance techniques for opening spaces to 
finance in the name of resilience – a spatial fix for finance. Moreover, the definition of urban 
resilience matters very little:10 GSA is not overly prescriptive about what urban resilience and its 
associated infrastructure might look like, but is more concerned with how, and by whom, 
projects are to be financed. The critical resilience literature has debated the precise, multiple, or 
empty definitions of resilience (Braun 2014), the family resemblances between resilience and 
neoliberalism or individualism/entrepreneurialism (Anderson 2015, Long and Rice 2019), and 
the forms of environmental governance that this facilitates (Grove 2018). The claim we make 
here, however, is not that urban resilience is financialization or has been financialized, but that 
GSA sets up urban resilience, whatever it might be, as dependent on private financial flows 
which turns on reformatting city governments. Accordingly, if the right kinds of reforms are 
enacted in cities in need of urban resilience, then familiar financial mechanisms – public-private 
partnerships (Whiteside 2019), municipal borrowing through labeled green bonds (Bigger and 
Millington 2019), or land-value capture11 (Weber 2010) to name a few – are the conduit by 
which investments can flow in, rents can flow out, and conditions amenable to resilience can be 
achieved (see O’Neill 2019). GSA, then, is about spatial fixing achieved through supranational 
initiatives as a response to overaccumulation, as new municipal capacities to absorb footloose 
capital aim to, “[fix] investments spatially, embedding them in the land, to create an entirely new 
landscape… for capital accumulation,” (Harvey, 2001, p.27) 
III. The productive discourse of development through urban resilience 
At the heart of GSA is a series of connections between urbanization, climate change and 
infrastructure in cities of the Global South and the types of interventions this confluence 
demands. The Bank diagnoses that rapid urbanization and climate change are causing costly 
infrastructural crises in cities. On the one hand, the costs of disasters in cities of the Global South 
are large and are growing. The Bank estimates that current average annual losses from disaster 
are more than $300 billion a year, anticipated to grow to $415 billion by 2030, and by 2050 
losses in coastal cities from sea level rise alone could top $1 trillion annually (World Bank 
2015b). Because cities are “hubs of economic” activity, losses associated with climate change 
threaten to “reverse hard-won development goals” (World Bank 2015b, 43; 13). Maintaining 
development gains in cities depends on access to infrastructure; financing infrastructure that is 
resilient to shocks and stresses is, therefore “one of the most urgent challenges in development” 
(World Bank 2015b, 43). As temperature increases, extreme weather events become more 
regular, and sea level rises, damage to urban water, energy, and transport infrastructure will 
                                                          
10 In its flagship report on financing urban resilience the World Bank defines urban resilience as “the ability of a 
system, entity, community or person to adapt to a variety of changing conditions and to withstand shocks while 
still maintaining essential functions” (World Bank 2015b, 19). 
11 Land-value capture is a form of financing that attempts to capture the value created from public investments in 
land. In the case of infrastructure financing for urban resilience, the World Bank hypothesises that land values will 
increase due to population growth, economic development, public investment in infrastructure, land use changes, 
and landowner investments, and that these increases can be monetized (‘captured’) through various tools (i.e. 
taxes, fees, incentives) to finance resilient infrastructure (City Resilience Program, n.d.).  
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degrade the services these systems provide (World Bank 2018c). As a result, both the capital and 
operating costs of infrastructural investments are expected to increase because of climate change, 
especially if proactive investments and strategic planning are not pursued (Rozenberg and Fay 
2019). 
The Bank narrative for justifying GSA unfolds as follows. Investing in urban resilience, and 
particularly resilient infrastructure, will abate losses from climate change and enhance 
development outcomes. A World Bank Urban Resilience Specialist noted that “the estimate is 
$400 billion to $1.1 trillion a year is needed just to make infrastructure climate and disaster 
proof”12; and then there are the additional costs of new infrastructures in rapidly urbanizing 
cities. Indeed, infrastructure spending in low and middle income countries is anticipated to be 
between two and eight per cent of GDP by 2030 (Rozenberg and Fay 2019), while up to 80% of 
losses from climate disaster could be avoided through investments in resilient infrastructure 
(World Bank 2015b). The Bank claims that an investment of $6 billion in a “resilience package” 
that includes financial measures ranging from the individual to national scale, could generate 
more than $36 billion in savings  (2015b). Infrastructure is projected to be particularly rewarding 
for cities as it increases economic growth and productivity: a 1% increase in infrastructure 
spending would generate 1.5% GDP growth over four years, and well planned and executed 
investments can be even more profitable (World Bank 2015b).  
But, the volume of funding needed for urban resilience dictates that public finance will be 
insufficient. As the Urban Resilience Specialist describes, the key problem for urban resilience is 
that “the money is not flowing”13. Given the trillion-dollar price tag, public sector financing – 
either locally through measures such as taxation or multilaterally through Official Development 
Assistance (ODA) – will always come up short. As a key document makes clear: “public 
investment alone, even when combined with ODA, is inadequate” (World Bank 2015b, 54). 
Thus, the Bank’s role is not simply as a lender for urban infrastructure with a bit of policy 
recommendation, but instead actively seeks to facilitate private investment by identifying “what 
are the obstacles and what are some of the measures that can overcome them?” And, “So where 
does the World Bank fit in, … how can we lead more?”14.  
Thankfully for vulnerable cities, the Bank finds that the world is awash with private capital ripe 
for investment in urban resilience. Indeed, “investment capital seems to be abundant” and 
investors and insurers have expressed a willingness to invest in a “broader universe of 
investment opportunities… [including] illiquid infrastructure assets in frontier emerging markets 
as a means of enhancing otherwise poor returns” (World Bank 2015b, 57; 58). It is now the role 
of the World Bank and other multilateral development actors to use their own investments, aid, 
and grant funding “in innovative ways to catalyze trillions” (World Bank 2018b, 1, see also 
Mawdsely, 2018a). Because, although there is abundant investment capital, “right now less than 
2% gets invested in urban infrastructure. So, these are pension funds, sovereign wealth funds, 
mutual funds, and they’re out there, they’re looking for reasonable returns, in a very low return 
market right now. So, we think there’s an opportunity to tap some of that in terms of leveraging 
and co-financing”15. As this quote reflects, the fixed income investors who might be attracted to 
                                                          
12 Interview, World Bank Urban Resilience Specialist, Washington DC, September 2016 
13 Interview, World Bank Urban Resilience Specialist, Washington DC, September 2016 
14 Interview, World Bank Urban Resilience Specialist, Washington DC, September 2016 
15 Interview, World Bank Urban Resilience Specialist, Washington DC, November 2016 
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high, stable return investments to pay for rapidly rising pension costs across the Global North 
(Clark 2000) are risk-averse and require generous subsidies and risk off-takes to invest, even in 
the face of an overaccumulation crisis that is marked by low yields in ‘conventional’ asset 
classes and markets. The Bank is developing programmatic initiatives that we group under the 
heading of GSA to make this form of investment less risky, more predictable, and more lucrative 
for Global North investors to own the infrastructure that comes to represent the survivability of 
Southern cities. The policy reforms and capital mobilization enabled by GSA produces cities as 
outlets for overaccumulated Northern capital, in line with other shifts to private-sector 
investability in development (Mawdsley, 2018b). The Bank’s role is to facilitate the export of 
regulatory frameworks and financial mechanisms far and wide, looking beyond “the investment 
in IBRD projects… [to] the guarantees, the stimulation of the insurance market, a whole range of 
financial products and the capacity to translate an assessment of a situation into a bankable 
investment”16.  
And yet, it is not simply the case that cities ‘just need access’ to this private capital because 
“many of these cities are constrained by other factors that reduce their access to credit” for urban 
resilience (World Bank 2015b, 15). These constraints fall in two key domains: financial and 
strategic governance on the one hand, and environmental data, measurement and monitoring on 
the other. The Bank finds that Global South cities have a variety of governance lacks that prevent 
them from accessing private capital (World Bank 2015b). Most cities lack the ability to 
strategically plan a pipeline of financeable investments and they cannot plan, in detail, urban 
infrastructure projects: “one of the biggest obstacles to money flowing into cities, is the lack of 
financeable projects, cities just don’t – in the developing world – know how to put together 
investments”17, or cities struggle to identify their goals for urban resilience and “translate that 
into bankable investments”18. Cities do not have sufficient urban planning or strategic risk 
planning capabilities, local project design implementation and assessment skills, or abilities to 
create and enforce regulations such as building codes and land use plans. Regulatory clarity is 
also needed, because even though Bank ideology dictates that markets can ensure the efficient 
delivery and operation of urban infrastructures, governments need to provide regulatory structure 
and institutions. But, these need to be regulations and institutions of a very specific kind, 
particularly suited to remove barriers to private sector investments: “capital inflow controls, tax 
policies, labor policies and inconsistent tariff policies can build complexity into a transaction and 
reduce the attractiveness of an investment” (World Bank 2015b, 47). Governance and regulation 
also may need to be rescaled so that city governments have the authority to build infrastructure, 
have control over zoning and land use, and have developed regulatory capacity in order to 
improve transparency, accountability and service delivery. The desirable municipality here lines 
up neatly with ‘model’ cities that have active PPP portfolios enabling private control of public 
goods, as in Mexico City.  
Cities also are constrained by their financial management and governance practices. From the 
Bank’s perspective, “many cities are not well managed financially, and are prone to risks of 
corruption”19. Municipal governments may have limited skills in fiscal management, capital 
investment planning and project preparation. As a result, cities are not creditworthy and cannot 
                                                          
16 Interview, World Bank Urban Resilience Specialist, Washington DC, September 2016 
17 Interview, World Bank Urban Resilience Specialist, Washington DC, September 2016 
18 Interview, World Bank Urban Resilience Specialist, Washington DC, November 2016 
19 Interview, World Bank Urban Resilience Specialist, Washington DC, November 2016 
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secure access to capital markets (World Bank 2018c). This is a critical issue for attracting the 
volume of investment envisioned by the Bank because of the symbolic importance and 
performativity of credit ratings (Paudyn, 2013). Capital constraints also arise from the inability 
for cities “to generate own-source revenues” (World Bank 2015b, 53). Instead, cities often rely 
on unpredictable transfers from central states for operating budgets, and cannot raise money 
through mechanisms like land taxes, or access capital markets without new legal frameworks or 
sovereign guarantees. Indeed, the Bank recognizes that as the expectations of city governments 
to provide urban resilience to citizens have increased, this has not been met with sufficient 
abilities to fund raise. These fiscal management lacks revolve around “the general lack of 
capacity within local government” – including a limited capacity in tax assessment, revenue 
collection, and enforcement (World Bank 2018c, 13). These governance challenges “send, sort 
of, dangerous signals to the market”20.  
In addition to strategic and financial management, cities are limited by a lack of environmental 
data for planning urban resilience. As is recognized by both programmers and critics of carbon 
markets – and repurposed here for urban resilience – measurement is vital to governance and 
financial management, because “you can’t value what you can’t measure” (Gifford 2020). 
Accordingly, in order to attract investors, cities need greater access to data about environmental 
risks, and the ability to work data into their strategic planning. Environmental and climatic data 
are integral to this endeavor – this includes the production of climate information and services, 
and ensuring that data are accessible to potential users (World Bank 2019b). Beyond climate 
data, there is a need to improve private sector confidence through the creation of benchmarked 
data for measuring resilience (World Bank 2019b). The Bank is busy creating new ratings, 
standards, and metrics systems that will “create incentives for, and improve the tracing of, global 
progress on adaptation and resilience” (World Bank 2019b, 5). This information is important for 
attracting private capital, particularly so-called impact investors because without ratings and 
benchmarks, there are no market prices or expectations of risk and return (World Bank 2015b). 
Currently, “markets lack uniform guidance on what constitutes a climate resilient investment” 
(World Bank 2019b, 16). Moreover, the Bank and others have determined that cities need to 
monetize and capture ‘resilience dividends’ (Rodin 2014). With investments in data and 
measurement of resilience, the World Bank anticipates “potentially unlock[ing] significant 
amounts of capital” (World Bank 2015b, 50). Overcoming urban governance and environmental-
climatic measurement challenges is central to the emerging World Bank agenda on urban 
resilience. The Bank aims to “help cities overcome some of these obstacles”21 through technical 
assistance programs and specialized financing facilities, magnifying the power of local and 
transnational technocrats.  
Building up measurement practices are part and parcel of using Bank resources to leverage 
private investment through a variety of low-cost financial mechanisms to de-risk private 
investment and signal non-monetary benefits that accrue from investments in resilience. 
Regarding urban resilience, the Bank records high leveraging ratios: across their climate 
investments, all Multilateral Development Banks claim to leverage three dollars of private 
finance for each dollar spent. This is even greater for the World Bank, as every dollar mobilized 
through its on-lent bonds results in five dollars of non-World Bank lending (World Bank, 2015). 
The repetition of these ratios reflects austerity ideology’s demand that ‘value for money’ be the 
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guiding principal of all public spending. In the Bank’s Pilot Program for Climate Resilience, 
$203 million in water, energy, and transport investments has “leveraged $661 million in co-
financing from government and private sources” (World Bank 2018c, 34). In the urban register, 
the Bank’s City Resilience Program aims to leverage its US$4 billion in multilateral financing to 
“crowd-in” $4 billion in private capital across 20 cities (World Bank 2015b). Leveraging 
revolves around strategic co-financing, but also guarantees and other risk management 
instruments, using the World Bank balance sheet, credit rating and technical assistance to 
incentivize private capital while leaving the “investing, driving innovation, and improving 
delivery” to the private sector (World Bank 2018b, 1). The World Bank is to be “a facilitator of 
capital” (World Bank 2018b, 3) leaving decisions about which urban resilience investments go 
ahead – likely those with highest and most secure returns rather than the pure public goods – and 
the form of the projects themselves to investors, as we now explore in specific examples of GSA 
programs.  
Facilities and programs of GSA 
While the World Bank’s version of urban resilience is being ‘mainstreamed’ into its overarching 
practices more broadly (World Bank 2019b), a handful of Bank initiatives exemplify GSA and 
the ways that it is becoming an organizing logic of and for capital. GSA as discourse and practice 
is not unique to the World Bank, or even the Bretton Woods institutions, but the Bank is the key 
node in the GSA ecosystem. With Bank leadership, the project is made actionable through a vast 
web of initiatives conducted in partnership with other institutions, including other development 
finance institutions, advocacy organizations, industry groups, bilateral aid agencies, think tanks, 
and philanthropies, from the UK Department for International Development to the Rockefeller 
Foundation. In this section, we review two Bank programs through which GSA is 
operationalized: the City Resilience Program and the City Creditworthiness Initiative.  
The City Resilience Program  
The World Bank’s flagship program for rendering cities investable to achieve urban resilience is 
the City Resilience Program (CRP). CRP was established in 2017 as part of a push to “make 
urban resilience a formal product line, so that it can become something that we [the Bank] do as 
business as usual”22. The goal of the CRP is to operate as “the investment banker to cities, 
helping to boost the bankability of projects and catalyze the flow of financial resources to 
emerging markets” (World Bank 2019a). But, these urban resilience projects need to be “better 
and bigger”, with ambition in technical design and financial scope (World Bank 2019a). The 
CRP has two key programs for cities which address “both sides of the challenge” (World Bank 
2018a): the Resilience Enhancement Track and the Capital Mobilization Track. Both Tracks are 
designed to facilitate investments specifically in urban resilience through technical (Resilience 
Enhancement Track) and financial (Capital Mobilization Track) assistance. Although the Tracks 
run independently cities often participate in both, either simultaneously or consecutively. Cities 
in the Resilience Enhancement Track undertake a broad scan to highlight resilience challenges 
based on geospatial data and thereby enable a conversation between cities and technical 
assistance at the Bank to “package, prioritize and design resilience enhancing investments” 
(GFDRR, 2019). Through this Track, cities design investments and strategic investment plans, 
ensuring that climate and disaster risks are embedded in decision-making. Bringing technical 
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assistance from across its ‘diverse ecosystem’, the Bank hopes to shift urban resilience from a 
sectoral concern to a strategic and integrated priority. In the Capital Mobilization Track, cities 
begin not by highlighting resilience challenges, but by diagnosing the ability to mobilize private 
capital; to date, 52 cities have formally participated in this assessment. Cities can then work with 
financial advisors (including through a ‘shark tank’ activity for city officials to pitch to investors) 
to ensure their enabling environment is amenable and their fiscal strategies are sound – with a 
focus on reviewing regulatory ‘roadblocks’, project valuation, and financial modelling. Since it 
was initiated, 90 cities have participated in the CRP, including 35 that joined in 2019. Five of 
these cities are now working “towards private capital transactions” and 16, from Abidjan to 
Tashkent, have received training for deployment of “geospatial solutions” (World Bank 2019a; 
GDFRR, n.d.).  
Through the two Tracks, the CRP hopes to ‘empower’ cities to program urban resilience 
investments – but the pursuit of private capital is paramount. In a survey about their involvement 
in CRP workshops, World Bank staff recognized that scaling and operationalizing private 
investments in urban resilience remained a challenge, but they also reiterated that the CRP 
process is essential for starting conversations “with urban counterparts not used to engaging with 
the finance masters on capital mobilization strategies”, helps “nudge the mindset towards … 
inviting private participations where possible” and is a useful tool “in pushing the PPP agenda” 
(City Resilience Program n.d.). The key financial tools that the CRP facilitates are PPPs – for 
either service delivery of investment and financing – and Land Value Capture (LVC), with direct 
lending to governments also considered, although less likely (City Resilience Program, n.d.).  
Consider the case of Can Tho City, Vietnam. Can Tho City is the “economic engine” of the 
Mekong Delta Region in Vietnam, and faces challenges from rapid urbanization, climate change 
and associated flooding, and a lack of infrastructure to serve the city’s population – in short, the 
suite of issues to which GSA is calibrated (World Bank 2015a). In 2014, Can Tho was the first 
city to undertake the City Strength Diagnostic Methodology – a process which involved 
conversations between city officials, key city stakeholders, and Bank staff in Washington and 
Hanoi to identify stresses and investment priorities to address these challenges (CityStrength 
2014). The tool is a precursor to the two CRP Tracks. The City Strength assessment identified 
that in order to address the twin risks of flooding and rapid urbanization, the city needed to 
manage urban growth by encouraging building in less flood-prone areas and pursuing policy-
change and investments in flood mitigation, and transport and sanitation infrastructure. The 
resulting $250 million Can Tho Urban Development and Resilience project aims to do exactly 
these things – combining infrastructural investments in engineering solutions to flooding, the 
construction of transport linkages, and policy reform (World Bank 2015a). Through the City 
Strength tool and its findings, “the government decided to change the focus of the project to 
incorporate aspects of urban resilience”23. The city’s engagement with the Bank’s technical 
assistance on urban resilience has shifted urban governance priorities to making resilience 
investable.  
Since this initial engagement, the Bank and Can Tho City have continued to pursue investments 
in urban resilience, and they city has participated in the City Resilience Program on the Capital 
Mobilization Track. Their Rapid Capital Assessment, through which the World Bank assesses 
the city’s potential for engaging PPPs and using LVC, is particularly illuminating of the kinds of 
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policy reforms that comprise GSA (City Resilience Program, n.d.). There have been several 
PPPs in Vietnam, particularly in the electricity sector, and now PPPs are planned for 
transportation, water and sanitation. However, in order to encourage more PPPs, particularly at 
the sub-national level, the World Bank has been overseeing regulatory changes to enhance 
“structuring and management” of PPPs (City Resilience Program, n.d., 36). The Bank has also 
facilitated a city scale ‘Infrastructure Financing Facility’ and ‘Local Development Infrastructure 
Funds’, both of which will fund municipal infrastructure investments. These facilities will act as 
a “second tier lender encouraging first tier lenders (commercial banks)” (City Resilience 
Program, n.d., 68), reflecting the leveraging strategy of GSA as city officials starved for 
infrastructure finance in the face of socio-environmental change search for investment. In terms 
of LVC, the Bank identifies the existing, paper cadaster as an impediment resulting in issues 
around “local market transparency” (City Resilience Program, n.d., 40). Although they find a 
willingness from investors and city officials to trade land for developer rights in infrastructure, 
the Bank suggests that local and national changes are needed to “organize and efficiently 
structure a process of disposition of development rights” (City Resilience Program, n.d., 43).  
The CRP, in other words, is working across city and national scales to transform policy 
environments and provide technical and geospatial solutions (i.e. around the cadaster) to ease 
implementation of PPPs, LVCs, and municipal debt instruments, as well as supporting urban 
governance transformations around urban planning and coordination (World Bank, 2018a). 
While SAPs of the 1980s and 90s were more violently imposed, the shifts that comprise GSA 
reflect a persuasive, disciplinary approach. GSA promises new financial flows to solve urban 
crises within an overarching discourse of global austerity, fiscal rectitude, the power of return-
seeking capital, and the devastation promised by climate change that public funds will be unable 
to avert. 20th century SAPs contributed to the normalization of policy that, across scales, has 
make thinking outside of the austerity-box significantly more difficult; GSA is the expression of 
these same logics pursued by other means and in response to the conditions produced, in part, 
through SAPs.  
Speculative attempts to reformat city governance in pursuit of investments in urban resilience are 
also evident in Jakarta, Indonesia, which has participated in phase one of both Tracks of the 
CRP. The Jakarta Urban Flood Mitigation Project aimed to regularize Jakarta’s many canals to 
prevent urban flooding, including through drainage, dredging, new dam systems, but also by 
evicting canal-side Kampung communities (Leitner, Sheppard, and Colven 2017). The Project 
began with “invest[ing] in information, on data… the whole spatial infrastructure… [so as to be] 
able to build the proper analysis.”24 This data and monitoring lead to systematic physical risk 
assessments. But governance transformations across the watershed were also identified by 
project personnel as integral to flood management – particularly creating better connections 
across local governments, and enabling national and provincial involvement to better produce, 
implement, and monitor multi-sector and multi-scalar land use change regulations and building 
codes. Project personnel also identified that urban governance transformations were integral for 
LVC for capital works to prevent flooding. For instance, dredging for flood mitigation produces 
sediment, which in turn can be used to create land. If “you value that with the value of land for 
… apartments going in there, the city government can actually pay the entire loan… It’s just 
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simple economics. Jakarta… anything they do, if they do it right, it can pay [for] itself. … But 
the systems to capture that rent is not there.”25 This quote demonstrates the Bank’s linear 
assumption that improved regulations to allow LVC, along with other mechanisms, will 
subsidize the costs of flood mitigation, creating the conditions for bankable projects and 
bankable cities that sum to urban resilience and the mainstreaming of Global South municipal 
infrastructure as an asset class.  
City Creditworthiness Initiative  
The City Creditworthiness Initiative (CCI) is the second exemplary program for understanding 
GSA. Per the CCI website, “[h]elping local and municipal governments access financing has 
become an integral part of the World Bank’s sustainable urban development strategy” (World 
Bank, n.d.), aiming to bring cities into regional, and eventually international, capital markets to 
fund resilient infrastructure. The CCI is broken into two main components: City 
Creditworthiness Academies (Academies) and City Creditworthiness Implementation Programs. 
Launched in 2013, the CCI builds on previous Bank work, especially an experiment building 
creditworthiness in Lima. The experiment was deemed successful when Lima was assessed at 
Ba1 by Moody’s, after which the city issued PEN593 million in debt to refinance local bank debt 
and undertake infrastructure projects (Moody’s Investor Services 2010; 2013). The Academies 
are training courses for bureaucrats to assess their city’s capacity to issue debt on regional or 
international capital markets, while Implementation Programs are long-term, in-depth, technical 
assistance programs to rectify impediments to creditworthiness that were identified at the 
Academies. The Bank’s estimated return-on-investment is eye-popping: the Bank claims a 
multiplier of $100 of external investment in urban resilience for every $1 in technical assistance 
(Podevin 2018). While not all of that 100:1 multiplier will be sourced from return seeking private 
capital, the Bank clearly sees potential for this version of technical assistance to make cities 
investable in the name of resilience. 
The first Creditworthiness Academy was held in Nairobi in 2013 and since then the Bank has 
hosted at least 8 Academies designed to build capacity of officials from more than 300 cities in 
30 countries. Ultimately the CCI aims to reach cities across 60 countries, which will 
subsequently diffuse to up to 2,000 cities through in-country best practice sharing in a bid to 
bridge the “creditworthiness gap”, after which cities can begin to close the “infrastructure gap” 
(Podevin 2018, 223). The achievement of a credit score – recognized internationally or 
regionally, or even a ‘shadow score’ gained through a less rigorous assessment to enable local 
bank lending – is a major step toward accessing debt for urban resilience, but one that poses 
significant challenges for many cities. As one Bank staffer put it:   
“Some people have said, well, can’t you change your articles of incorporation to 
allow for this direct lending to cities, and our response is, well, we could but the 
market is very small, because a city has to be creditworthy in order to borrow 
directly from the World Bank, or from any kind of Bank…. So, I think the 
challenge is really not necessarily for us to change our behavior, but to help cities 
to be able to access capital markets by becoming creditworthy”26 
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Here, the Bank specialist points to one of the key motivations and modalities of GSA, in that 
Bank operations are still pitched primarily at states, not cities. Around 4% of the 500 largest 
cities in the Global South are considered internationally creditworthy; that number grows to 
around 20% of cities if the scale of creditworthiness is regional (World Bank, n.d.). This means 
that 400 of the world’s largest cities do not have access to debt, seen by the Bank as both a 
problem to be rectified through technical assistance and as an opportunity for stagnant capital. 
Providing technical assistance to municipal governments rescales the modalities of ‘Maximizing 
Finance for Development’ to the urban, without need to alter the Bank’s charter (Mawdsely, 
2018a).  
Academies are not only about collating data that can flow into credit score applications, although 
the implementation of standardized accountancy practices is the first step in becoming debt-
ready. Advice is offered, along with examples of best practices from around the world, to 
improve municipal fiscal outlooks. These governance recommendations tend to be well-worn 
tropes regarding transparency, reducing corruption, improvements in revenue collection, 
reductions in service provision, and building all manner of capacities to outsource municipal 
governance functions and infrastructure provision. For example, CCI technical assistance and 
funding allowed Arusha, Tanzania, to use geotagging and GIS mapping to identify small 
businesses that had avoided taxation, thereby improving revenue collection. The aim was not 
simply to collect tax for improved municipal services, but as a waypoint toward issuing 
municipal debt on East African financial markets (Bernasconi and Gallo 2017).  
The crash-course in becoming-investable offered during the Academies is only the beginning for 
cities. Those dedicated to becoming investable graduate onto City Creditworthiness 
Implementation Programs, the goal of which is to, “help participants prepare for, structure, and 
close market-based financing transactions for climate-smart infrastructure projects” (Podevin 
2018, 232). In order to do so:  
“the CCI helps city financial officers in conducting thorough reviews of their municipal 
revenue systems, in understanding how ratings agencies and potential investors assess 
credit quality, and in taking the first steps to qualify for a rating while recognizing that 
achieving an investment grade will likely take several years of effort. Improving credit 
standing is important even where private capital lending is not yet possible because the 
factors that contribute to creditworthiness can be broadly interpreted to stand for good 
governance and administration” (Podevin 2018, 232).  
This statement, shot through with the concerns of New Institutional Economic (Best, 2014), 
underlines how various aspects of GSA center on policy reform, even where this will not 
immediately produce new financial flows but may do so in the future, reforms that are seen as 
‘no regret’ interventions. The policies facilitated through the Academies are consistent with 
those offered through Development Policy Lending; while GSA may be diffuse across an array 
of Bank programs, there is internal consistency. In all cases, the debt-bearing city is to be the 
outcome of technical assistance and lending. Similarly, the Bank desires in client states just what 
private investors want from cities: predictable regulation and markets that fund municipal 
contributions to return-generating infrastructure that function as points where investable capital 
can touch down.  
The ideology and practices of GSA are still being deployed, but there is no shortage of examples 
of the financial mechanisms to be enabled through this process. The Bank’s Investing in Urban 
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Resilience (2015b) report lists 34 separate financial mechanisms for channeling private capital 
into cities for resilient infrastructure. Of these, about one third are insurance and disaster relief 
funding channels while the others are more purely about steering capital into bankable projects. 
Consider Kampala, which has been enrolled into a variety of Bank urban resilience programs. 
Kampala is growing rapidly, and its hydraulic infrastructure currently fails to deliver clean 
drinking water to most residents. In the face of less predictable, more intense rainfall, flood and 
disease risks proliferate (UN-HABITAT 2009). Following $33 million in Bank concessional 
finance to the national government for the ‘Kampala Institutional and Infrastructure 
Development Project’, which paid for staff training, IT upgrades, and small infrastructural 
upgrading for flood relief (World Bank 2015c), Kampala hosted a Creditworthiness Academy for 
25 Ugandan municipalities in 2015. Since then, Kampala has become a Bank posterchild for 
municipal revenue collection. Local government has increased incomes by 250% since 2012 by 
separating the tax collection competency from expenditures, poaching staff from other 
departments to work on revenue collection, implementing an electronic collection system, 
conducting an ad campaign to raise awareness about tax, among other steps (Andema and Haas, 
2018). Meanwhile, Kampala also adopted a municipal PPP policy (World Bank 2017; Painter 
2018). Increased revenue without increased spending has led local credit rating agencies to 
pronounce Kampala a good lending risk; however, Ugandan national policy limits municipal 
borrowing on capital markets, making Kampala dependent on commercial bank borrowing for 
now, though calls for financial devolution are growing (Gorelick 2018).  
While municipal officials wait for policy changes to enable bond issuance, Kampala has, drawn 
on technical assistance programs from the Bank to enable future privatization and borrowing. 
These capacities are pitched at producing a managerial government that can identify 
infrastructure projects to build municipal resilience – from using hydrological data for planning 
green-grey flood relief projects to drafting tenders for build-own-operate PPP contracts. At 
Kampala’s Academy the city identified 84 resilience projects in its ‘Climate Smart Capital 
Investment Plan’; further technical assistance aims to refine and prioritize those projects into a 
pipeline of investable projects (ICED 2017). Ultimately, hydraulic infrastructure PPPs could be 
financed through a combination of green-labeled general obligation bonds, commercial lending 
from local and regional banks, and LVC from commercial development on plots previously 
unsuitable due to flood risk, and the increased tax-take from those developments. Debt could be 
subsidized through IFC credit guarantees or a sovereign guarantee backstopped by political 
insurance from the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (a World Bank Group institution). 
In short, the aim is to build capacity to deploy a diverse financial toolkit to produce cities replete 
with investment opportunities for regional and international investors.  
IV. Conclusion: Capitalist realism and resilience 
The gears for rendering cities around the world investable in the name of climate resilience are 
turning. However, the current focus is on creating enabling conditions rather than in tracking 
billions in return-oriented capital into the Global South for resilient infrastructure. If the old 
structural adjustment was, to a large extent, about reinscribing core-periphery relations through 
uneven terms of trade, limiting the possibilities for endogenous development in the Global 
South, and securing Northern access to primary resources (Tsvangirai, in Yeros, 2013), GSA 
aims to accomplish a similar reinscription by allowing capital to flow into urban built 
environments, thereby extracting rents from Northern financed, owned, and operated 
infrastructure while ameliorating structural overaccumulation that has inflated Northern asset 
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prices and driven down financial yields. To date, GSA is less about new mechanisms through 
which the financialization of nature or infrastructure is accomplished, and more a spatial-fix 
through governance reforms and blended finance. The scalar switch to cities is an important 
feature for emerging understandings of ‘frontier financialization' (Langley 2018). In the logics 
and practices of GSA, not all ‘frontiers’ are equally investable, nor do they all promise lucrative 
returns. Although the concentration of capital and populations in vulnerable cities across the 
Global South is an opportunity to produce investable enclaves, this turns on making resilience a 
question of investment. Adaptation then becomes a problem addressed by investors and city 
elites, rather than those most likely impacted by climate change (Bigger and Millington 2019) or, 
indeed, those impacted by new urban infrastructure themselves (Betteridge and Webber 2019).  
GSA is not yet fully hegemonic, nor does Bank or wider development industry practice 
encompass these discourses and practices to the exclusion of other modes and models for 
development; rather, our argument, for now, is circumscribed for practices relating to resilience 
in cities. The array of programs, facilities, and mechanisms we have presented here, however, is 
an increasingly critical part of the development industry, aligned with both New Washington 
Consensus and the Wall Street Consensus. The Bank has scaled up its urban-oriented programs, 
and has rising targets for its urban resilience agenda; from a baseline of around $10 billion in 
investment in 41 countries from 2011 to 2016, it aims to leverage $25 billion per year from 2017 
to 2022, with projections rising thereafter (World Bank 2015b). If successful, this ambition 
would represent a dramatic ramp-up in urban infrastructure investment, irrespective of the 
source, and consolidation of urban resilience as a primary ‘product line’ for the Bank. While 
many of the constituent pieces of GSA were developed and expanded under former Director 
General Kim, the bank has continued to move in this direction under new Director General 
Malpass who advocates for the “efficient use of capital” (World Bank, n.d.). This direction of 
travel is troubling and future developments merit careful scholarly attention and policy 
intervention. 
Going forward, we identify three particular areas of research for elucidating the impacts of GSA. 
First, our approach here has been broad, but grounded research is needed about GSA-enabled 
investments, the context-dependent ways in which financiers, technocrats and specific financial 
mechanisms realize urban resilience investments, and how communities are affected by the 
deployment of infrastructure as a solution to climate-inflected vulnerabilities. Second, forensic 
accounting is necessary to trace actual capital flows and thereby evaluate the scope and macro-
economic impact of GSA discourses and practices. Third, comparative research could help 
differentiate contrasting modalities of infrastructure finance and governance. This might take the 
form of in-country assessments of infrastructure finance through GSA-aligned programs that are 
also recipients of funding from institutions beyond the western development industry, like the 
Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. 
In policy terms, we reject the overriding narrative that ‘There is No Alternative’ to GSA, as well 
as the various, supposedly post-ideological ‘solutions’ emanating from the ‘Solutions Bank’. 
Yet, we concur with the Bank that solutions must look to solving the twin problems of project 
design and development and capital availability for those projects. But, rather than delegate 
problem-solving to markets (which have manifestly failed to achieve good environmental and 
development outcomes for the last 40 years), we see much promise in emerging narratives 
around a global Green New Deal that foregrounds solidarity financing through Northern 
recognition and recompense for ‘climate debts’ while delegating the task of identifying critical 
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public goods for investment to communities who would benefit (see Aranoff et al 2019). Perhaps 
the most important area of research, then, is elaborating the contours of how this could be 
operationalized. Geographers are well situated to imagine and help produce futures beyond the 
grim narrowness of perpetual austerity.  
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